Coinfection With HIV and SARS-CoV-2 in Wuhan, China: A 12-Person Case Series.

BACKGROUND: Given the magnitude of the global COVID-19 pandemic, persons living with HIV (PLWH) may become coinfected with SARS-CoV-2. SETTING: We conducted a survey in Wuhan, China, to characterize the status of coinfected PLWH, their time to clinical improvement, and clinical prognoses. METHODS: Using a Wuhan shipping service for antiretroviral medications, the Wuhan LGBT Center screened 2900 PLWH shipping addresses and cross-referenced 36 of them to quarantine sites or hospitals, suggesting possible COVID-19 cases. Through telephone calls and WeChat (social media) messaging, we conducted a survey after obtaining online informed consent. RESULTS: We had 12 HIV-infected respondents (10 men and 2 women) who also reported COVID-19. The median age was 36 years (interquartile range: 33.0-56.3), mean age 42.4 years, and range 25-66 years of age. Nine of 10 persons on antiretroviral therapy (ART) presented with only mild COVID-19 symptoms. The 10th person on ART was a 56-year-old man who died at home early in the outbreak when health care services were overwhelmed. Two additional cases who had been in intensive care with acute COVID-19 were both men, aged 25 and 37 years; both were ART-naive until this hospitalization. Excluding the deceased man, 6 of 11 coinfected persons reported feeling depressed even after clinical improvements. CONCLUSION: Twelve coinfected persons were identified in Wuhan; 9 of 10 were on long-term ART and had favorable outcomes. Two men identified as having started ART only recently were found to have severe symptoms. Our case series suggests the value of ART for potential mitigation of COVID-19 coinfection.

Three Experimental Common High-Risk Procedures: Emission Characteristics Identification and Source Intensity Estimation in Biosafety Laboratory

Biosafety laboratory is an important place to study high-risk microbes. In biosafety laboratories, with the outbreak of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, experimental activities have become increasingly frequent, and the risk of exposure to bioaerosols has increased. To explore the exposure risk of biosafety laboratories, the intensity and emission characteristics of laboratory risk factors were investigated. In this study, high-risk microbe samples were substituted with Serratia marcescens as the model bacteria. The resulting concentration and particle size segregation of the bioaerosol produced by three experimental procedures (spill, injection, and sample drop) were monitored, and the emission sources' intensity were quantitatively analyzed. The results showed that the aerosol concentration produced by injection and sample drop was

Three Experimental Common High-Risk Procedures: Emission Characteristics Identification and Source Intensity Estimation in Biosafety Laboratory.

Biosafety laboratory is an important place to study high-risk microbes. In biosafety laboratories, with the outbreak of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, experimental activities have become increasingly frequent, and the risk of exposure to bioaerosols has increased. To explore the exposure risk of biosafety laboratories, the intensity and emission characteristics of laboratory risk factors were investigated. In this study, high-risk microbe samples were substituted with Serratia marcescens as the model bacteria. The resulting concentration and particle size segregation of the bioaerosol produced by three experimental procedures (spill, injection, and sample drop) were monitored, and the emission sources' intensity were quantitatively analyzed. The results showed that the aerosol concentration produced by injection and sample drop was 103 CFU/m3, and that by sample spill was 102 CFU/m3. The particle size of bioaerosol is mainly segregated in the range of 3.3-4.7 µm. There are significant differences in the influence of risk factors on source intensity. The intensity of sample spill, injection, and sample drop source is 3.6 CFU/s, 78.2 CFU/s, and 664 CFU/s. This study could provide suggestions for risk assessment of experimental operation procedures and experimental personnel protection.

Social Media Survey and Web Posting Assessment of the COVID-19 Response in China: Health Worker Attitudes Toward Preparedness and Personal Protective Equipment Shortages.

BACKGROUND: Understanding health worker awareness, attitudes, and self-confidence in the workplace can inform local and global responses toward emerging infectious threats, like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Availability of accessible personal protective equipment (PPE) is vital to effective care and prevention. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional survey from February 24 to 28, 2020, to assess COVID-19 preparedness among health workers. In addition, we assessed trends from search engine web crawling and text-mining data trending over the Sina Weibo platform from January 1 to March 3, 2020. Data were abstracted on Chinese outbreak preparedness. RESULTS: In the survey, we engaged 6350 persons, of whom 1065 agreed to participate, and after an eligibility logic check, 1052 participated (16.6%). We accessed 412 internet posts as to PPE availability. Health workers who were satisfied with current preparedness to address COVID-19 were more likely to be female, to obtain knowledge about the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreak from government organizations, and to consider their hospital prepared for outbreak management. Health workers with more confidence in their abilities to respond were those with more faith in their institution's response capacities. Elements of readiness included having airborne infection isolation rooms, visitor control procedures, and training in precautions and PPE use. Both survey and web post assessments suggested that health workers in need were unable to reliably obtain PPE. CONCLUSIONS: Health workers' self-confidence depends on perceived institutional readiness. Failure to maintain available PPE inventory for emerging infectious diseases preparedness suggests a failure to learn key lessons from the 2003-2004 SARS outbreak in China.